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P.: Present and Possible Future Enforcement Procedures in Claims agai

STUDENT NOTES
committee on the whole on legislative department,' and no discussion of it is found anywhere in the journal."5 It was his opinion
that perhaps the provision was adopted by the convention because
they contemplated possible involvement and harassment of the state
by reason of inherited debts and obligations.
The historical origins of sovereign immunity from suits are
found in the medieval concept of the divine right of kings, which in
England was expressed in the ancient maxim, "The King can do
no wrong." 6 It would seem that such a notion would be totally
repugnant to a country such as ours, dedicated as it has been from
an early date to the principles of equality and due process of law;
however, such has not been the case. In a number of early cases after
the Revolution the doctrine was vigorously applied in both state and
federal courts.7 Indeed, so intense was the need felt for the substance of the doctrine, that its apparent impairment by a federal
court decision in 1793, wherein article III, section 2, of the United
States Constitution s was interpreted as subjecting a state to the
court's jurisdiction at the instance of the citizen of another state,9
promptly gave rise to the eleventh amendment, wherein such subjection of a state to federal jurisdiction was expressly prohibited. 10
In 1907 Justice Holmes, for the first time in the long history
of the doctrine, made an attempt to justify it as a legal principle.
He said, "[T] here can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends."" Also, some
writers have recognized that the public policy in favor of noninterference with the performance of governmental functions is an important factor to be considered, and should be balanced against the
5
Bouchelle, Repeal of Section 85 of Article VI of the West Virginia
Constitution and Adoption of Amendment Permitting Suits and Actions
Against
the State, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 259, 260 (1941).
6
Note, 40 MINN. L. REv. 234 (1955); Barry, The King Can Do No
Wrong, 11 VA. L. REv. 849 (1925).
7 The slogan was solemnly renounced by the Supreme Court as forming
any part of the law of the United States in Langford v. United States, 101
U.S. 341 (1879); however, most cases fail even to pay lip-service to this
renunciation.
S"The judicial power [of the United States] shall extend to all cases.
between a State and Citizens of another State."
9 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
10 This amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
1 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). For an exhaustive refutation of both the logic and practicality of the statement see Borchard,
GovernmentalResponsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 757, 1039 (1927).
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need for judicial protection of individual rights from illegal state
12
action.
Whatever the justification, or lack of it, it is a well settled
principle in this country that neither the federal government nor a
state may be sued by its citizens without its consent, and the con.
stitutions of four states expressly provide that they may not be
13
made a defendant at law or in equity.
I
Forhmately for West Virginians, there are statutes in this state
which "provide a simple and expeditious method for the consideration of claims against the state that because of the provisions of
section 85, article 6 of the constitution of the state, and of statutory
restrictions, inhibitions or limitations, cannot be determined in a
court of law or equity... "14 These provisions set up a process
whereby claims against the state, its subdivisions or agents, may be
heard by the attorney general who in turn, when the facts seem to
justify, may make recommendations to the director of the budget
concerning awards. The list of awards is then submitted to the
legislature for appropriation. 15
Jurisdiction of the attorney general extends to the following
matters:
1. "Claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex
contractu and ex delicto, against the state or any of its agencies,
which the state as a soverign commonwealth should in equity
and good conscience discharge and pay.
2. "Claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated,
ex contractu and ex delicto, which may be asserted in the nature
of set-off or counterclaim on the part of the state or any of its
agencies.
3. "The legal or equitable status, or both, of any claims
' 2 See Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign 1mwmunity Doctrine, 59 Hxnv. L. Rxv. 1062 (1946); Note, 55 COLuM. L. REv. 73

(1955).
13 ALA. CoNST. art. 1, § 14; ARx. CONST. art. 5, § 20; ILL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 26; and of course W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 85. One state has a statutory

provision to the same effect. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8634 (Williams 1984).
14W. VA. CODE ch. 14, art 2, § 1 (Michie 1955). Thus the legislature

has, at least impliedly, recognized the injustices created by the present constitutional provision.
15 W. VA. CODE ch. 14, art. 2, § § 1-12 (Michie 1955). For an example
of such a general appropriation by the legislature, see W. Va. Acts 1957, ch. 18.
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referred to the attorney general
by the head of a state agency
6
for advisory determination."1
Although the attorney generals jurisdiction in this area is quite
broad, the citizen is not limited to this procedure alone for satisfaction of his claim. Another method commonly used is to submit
the claim to a member of the legislature in the form of a special
bill authorizing the specific agency or subdivision concerned to pay
the claimant. This bill, if passed by the legislature, authorizes pay7
ment by the state.'
Regardless of whether the citizen submits his claim through
the attorney general's office or directly to the legislature, he still may
not obtain relief even though the funds are appropriated or payment
is authorized. The state auditor may refuse to pay a particular
appropriation or the particular state agency or subdivision involved
may refuse to pay even though authorized to do so, in which case
the claimant is forced to seek mandamus relief against one or other
as the case may be. The defense usually employed in such case is
the absence of a "moral obligation" on the part of the state to pay
the claim. 18 The existence of a moral obligation would, of course,
normally be a question of fact for a jury, but since the supreme
court has original jurisdiction in mandamus actions against state
agencies and officers, there is no opportunity for a jury trial of this
question, and, as yet, no workable rule has been developed by the
court for determining its answer. In cases of negligent injury to
property the court has said a moral obligation of the state, declared
by the legislature to exist in favor of a claimant, will be sustained,
and an appropriation for payment upheld, when the conduct of
agents or employees of the state which proximately caused such
injury is such as would be judicially held to constitute negligence
in an action for damages between private persons. 19 Thus a much
16 W. VA. CODE ch. 14, art. 2, § 4 (Michie 1955).

Note that under this

section West Virginia will recognize tort claims brought against it, whereas
many states will not. See Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist.,
41 Cal. 2d 33, 257 P.2d 22 (1953); Manion v. State, 303 Mich. 1, 5 N.W.2d

527, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 677 (1942).
17 E.g. W Va. Acts 1957, ch. 172. In State v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 623, 46
S.E.2d 90 (1947), the court held that provisions of art. IV, § 35, do not prevent the recognition of a "moral obligation" upon the part of the state which
may be discharged by the appropriation of public funds to private individuals.
3S For a general discussion of the case law in West Virginia on the sovereign immunity of state agencies, see the comment in this by Mr. Robert G.
Dorsey. See also, Note, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 66 (1936); Comment, 30 W. VA. L.Q.
291 (1924).
19State v. Sims, 139 W. Va. 92, 79 S.E.2d 277 (1953); Price v. Sims,
134 W. Va. 173, 58 S.E.2d 657 (1950).
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stronger case would be required of a claimant to recover on a "moral
obligation" than would be needed had the case been tried before a
jury in the circuit court. And still, the five judges of the supreme
court, being only human, will differ as to when an act will judicially
constitute negligence. The claimant and the state, therefore, are
not only being deprived of a trial by jury; their case, in effect, is
being tried by a five-man jury which is not even required to reach
a unanimous verdict. This is but one example of the inadequacies
of the present procedure, which has been forced on the citizens and
the state by the immunity provision of the constitution.
In considering the special bills of authorization put forth for
the claimant by a member of the legislature to be passed by that
body, a more obvious procedural inadequacy immediately becomes
apparent. It would be naive to assume that political-pull, political
pressures, and political affiliations have nothing to do with the
passage of such bills; consequently politics, which has no place in
the wheels of justice, becomes inexorably enmeshed therein, to the
possible prejudice of the claimant, or perhaps, even the state. Admittedly, this procedure has the advantage of simplicity, yet justice
should be administered without fear or prejudice-two elements
which might possibly arise during consideration of a claimants
proposed special bill.
III
If the proposed amendment to article VI, section 85 be
adopted,20 the more obvious defects of the present procedure mentioned above, along with other inadequacies, could be cured by
legislation. This section, if amended would read: "The State of
West Virginia, including any of its subdivisions, may be made a
party defendant in such cases and under such conditions as may be
prescribed by law." The constitutions of nineteen states provide
that the state shall be subject to suit in such manner and in such
courts as the legislature shall determine.2 1 Although the amendment as proposed by the constitutional revision commission does
not specify that suits shall be tried "in such courts as the legislature
20
A similar amendment was proposed almost thirty years ago; however
it died in the legislature. It provided that "the State of West Virginia shall
never be made defendant in any court of law or equity without its consent,
hereafter duly given by the Legislature." W. VA. LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK,
Report
21 of Constitution Commission 80 (1931).

Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska,

New York, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,

South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
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may determine," it is submitted that the legislature would do well
to provide a court system for litigation of claims against the state.
West Virginia should not let herself slip into the mire in which other
states have found themselves, even without a constitutional provision as harsh as ours. Why cast off our present immunity provision if we cannot improve on the claim procedures now in force
thereunder?
"Adjudication of controversies is better than settlement of
controversies by sheer force, whether or not the government is
one of the parties. Yet a holding that sovereign immunity is
a bar to a decision on the merits when a state . . . is one of
the parties means that the controversy is likely to be disposed
of by use of force, or at best by resort to political power. Even
though the courts are especially qualified to decide questions
of law and fact concerning property and contracts and torts,
these are the very questions which the doctrine of sovereign
immunity most often prevents the courts from deciding.
"Five powerful reasons show the need for reform: (1) the
injustice of refusing judicial relief when government officers
infringe the legal rights of a private party, (2) the impracticability of substituting force or political power for adjudication
of controversies that courts are especially qualified to determine,
(3) wasteful litigation which stems from judicial fluctuation
from one line of authority to another, (4) the almost unbelievable lack of scientific judicial inquiry into the reasons
for the basic doctrine, and (5) disappearance of the only reasons that supported the doctrine of sovereign immunity when
the doctrine was introduced into American law during the first
22
half of the nineteenth century."
Existing types of procedure may be roughly divided into four
classes. Many states leave the determination of claims, apart from
legislative action, entirely in the discretion of a single executive,
frequently the state auditor or comptroller. Occasionally a board
of officers, of whom the auditor is usually a member, renders the
same service. A number of states allow suits in their general courts,
while a few have a specially constituted tribunal, a court of claims,
or board of examiners.23
Of the four classes presented, hearings before a judicial or quasijudicial tribunal seem preferable to determination by administrative
22

Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other
Than23Damages, 40 CoNmL L.Q. 3 (1954).
For an exhaustive, but perhaps somewhat outdated, classification according to the statutory provisions of the various states, see Notes, 44 HA~v. L. REv.
432 (1930).
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officers. "Judges are by training and tradition better qualified to
handle the problems presented than are officials selected primarily
for their executive ability. The latter, burdened with other and
different duties, must either sacrifice thoroughness or, what is even
more prevalent, leave all investigation to inefficient subordinates
largely motivated by political interests."2 4 In any case, the claim
should be decided by a body in which the legislature has confidence, for if an appropriation is needed, it should be prompt and
virtually automatic. 25 "If the claim is rejected, neither political considerations nor distaste for the rule of law controlling the case should
carry weight with the legislature except under the most extraordinary circumstances." 2 6
One of the advantages of a trial by a judicial tribunal in these
cases would be the uniformity of decisions which should result.
Also more realistic rules might be developed with which the court
could work.2 7 There should, however, be some method provided
for compromising claims which do not merit litigation. This task
could best be performed, perhaps, by the attorney general or state
auditor.
Before the state could be made defendant in a court of law or
equity, however, solutions would have to be found for a number
of problems which would necessarily arise.28 Six of the more immediate ones might be:
1. Should the legislature provide a special court to try suits
and actions on claims against the state or should they be tried by
courts of general jurisdiction?
2. If they are tried by courts of general jurisdiction, should a
jury be used to decide questions of fact?29
3. If the court system is used, should the consent requirement
be completely abolished?
24
25

Id. at 434, 435.

Promptness can be achieved by the creation of a contingent fund
against which warrants can be drawn, thereby doing away with the necessity
for legislative appropriation. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 258, § 3 (1956).
26 Note 23 supra, at 435.
2
7 The presence or absence of a "moral obligation" on the part of the
state could be ignored in the sense it is now recognized. See part II, supra.
28 For the solutions provided by the federal government, see Court of
Claims, 28 U.S.C. §§ 241-293 (1952), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1494
(Supp. V, 1.958).
29 A jury may possibly be prejudiced in favor of the claimant and against
the "all-powerful state.
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4. If they are tried by a special court, will this court have one
location or will it sit in various parts of the state?
5. If they are tried by courts of general jurisdiction, who will
defend the state?
6. Regardless of which system is used, how can the court and
the state guard against fraudulent claims?
Space limitations prevent inquiry into possible solutions for
these and other problems which would arise should the state submit
to the role of defendant in a court of law or equity; however solutions would have to be found in order to properly implement the
proposed amendment, provided, of course, it is adopted.
T. E. P.
CASE COMMENTS
ANNuLMENT-RsiDNcE BEQunEMmENTs-APPLicABILrY oF DivorcE STATUnm.-P, a resident of Canada, filed a bill of complaint

for annulment in the circuit court of Wayne County, Michigan. The
bill alleged that D is a resident of Wayne County. The Michigan
statute dealing with annulment requires only that one party to the
suit be a resident of the county where the bill is filed. The divorce
statute, however, may be invoked only upon fulfilling certain additional residence requirements. Held, that statutory residence requirements regulating divorce suits are inapplicable to suits for
annulment. Hill v. Hill, 93 N.W.2d 157 (Mich. 1958).
Provisions similar to those of the Michigan statute are likewise
found in the statutes of the majority of jurisdictions. That is, there
are specific statutes dealing with the venue requirements for petitions for annulment while another statute provides the residence
requirements for divorce suits.
The only important divergence from this scheme is that in many
states the venue statute applicable to annulments likewise applies
to suits for divorce, so that both jurisdictional and venue requirements must be met in an action for divorce. West Virginia follows

this view. Morgan v. Vest, 125 W. Va. 367, 24 S.E.2d 329 (1948).
However, the question in the principal case is the reverse of the preceding situation, that is, whether or not the sections of the divorce

statute relating to jurisdiction apply to petitions for annulment.
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